Reportability Reportable
Bench Division Bench (2)
Importance Notable
Result Appeal Allowed
Verified source: Reported as 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146. Full judgment on Indian Kanoon / LiveLaw. Bench, citation and holding cross-checked before publication.
⚖ Case at a Glance
Case TitleShally Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab
Citation2026 LiveLaw (SC) 146
Court & BenchSupreme Court — Justices Aravind Kumar & Prasanna B. Varale (Division Bench)
Date of DecisionFebruary 2026
ProvisionSection 482 BNSS, 2023 (formerly S.438 CrPC) — Anticipatory Bail
OutcomeHigh Court order set aside; bail granted
ResultAppeal Allowed
Status: Good law as on the date of review — not reported as overruled or stayed.
Court Journey — Stage by Stage
Stage 12025Rejected
Trial Court (Court of Session)
The appellant, apprehending arrest in an FIR registered in 2025 under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 for alleged trespass and theft, first moved the Court of Session for anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS. The Session Court declined relief, treating the allegations of house-trespass and removal of articles as serious enough to refuse pre-arrest protection, without dwelling on the essentially civil character of the underlying property dispute.
Stage 208 Dec 2025Rejected
Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aggrieved by the rejection, the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court too declined anticipatory bail. Significantly, it denied relief on parity even though co-accused in the very same FIR had already been granted bail, reasoning that the appellant had not "fully cooperated" with the investigation because he had declined to answer certain specific questions put to him by the Investigating Officer. This refusal to answer was, in effect, treated as non-cooperation disentitling him to bail.
FinalFeb 2026Present JudgmentAllowed
Supreme Court of India
On appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court issued notice on 8 January 2026 and granted interim protection on the condition that the appellant cooperate with the investigation; he did appear before the Investigating Officer. Allowing the appeal, the Court set aside the High Court order and directed that the appellant be released on anticipatory bail on terms to be fixed by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer, subject to his appearing before the trial court on all hearing dates unless specifically exempted. The Court held that his mere refusal to answer particular questions could not, by itself, be branded non-cooperation.
Facts in Brief
The appellant was named as an accused in an FIR registered in 2025 for offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. According to the complainant, the appellant along with co-accused trespassed into the complainant's house and removed articles kept inside. The complainant asserted possession of the house on the strength of an agreement to sell dated 6 August 2025 — a circumstance that lent the entire matter the colour of a civil dispute over immovable property rather than a conventional theft. After the trial court and the High Court both refused anticipatory bail, the appellant carried the matter to the Supreme Court. Pursuant to interim protection granted by the Supreme Court, the appellant presented himself before the Investigating Officer but declined to answer some of the specific questions put to him, which the prosecution characterised as non-cooperation.
Questions Before the Court
1
Whether an accused's refusal to answer specific questions put by the Investigating Officer, by itself, amounts to "non-cooperation" sufficient to deny anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS.
2
Whether the appellant was entitled to anticipatory bail on the ground of parity, given that co-accused in the same FIR had already been granted bail.
3
What weight the essentially civil character of the underlying dispute (possession under an agreement to sell) should carry in the bail assessment.
What the Court Decided
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court order. It held that the appellant was entitled to anticipatory bail and directed his release on conditions to be imposed by the jurisdictional Investigating Officer, with the safeguard that he attend the trial court on every date unless exempted. The grant of relief rested on the combined effect of three findings: the appellant had in fact appeared before the Investigating Officer as directed; the underlying dispute was essentially civil, concerning possession of immovable property under an agreement to sell; and co-accused in the same FIR had already been admitted to bail, squarely attracting the principle of parity.
The Binding Principle
Ratio Decidendi
An accused who appears before the Investigating Officer pursuant to interim protection but declines to answer certain questions does not, by that fact alone, fail to cooperate. The mere refusal to answer specific questions cannot be the sole ground to deny anticipatory bail, particularly where the dispute is essentially civil in nature and similarly placed co-accused have already been granted bail on parity.
In the Court's words, not answering the questions of the IO would not ipso facto mean there is non-cooperation.
Why the Court Held So
Cooperation does not mean self-incrimination. The Court drew a clear line between the duty to make oneself available to the investigation and a supposed duty to answer every question to the satisfaction of the prosecution. Cooperation, properly understood, is satisfied when the accused presents himself before the Investigating Officer as directed. It does not oblige him to surrender the protection against self-incrimination by furnishing every answer the investigator desires. To equate silence on specific questions with non-cooperation would convert anticipatory bail into a tool to compel answers — a result the law does not sanction.
The nature of the dispute mattered. The Court was conscious that the complainant's claim rested on an agreement to sell and that the quarrel was, at bottom, about possession of immovable property. Where the dispute wears a predominantly civil character, the apprehension of arrest in what is dressed up as a theft and trespass case calls for a careful, liberty-protecting approach rather than a mechanical refusal of pre-arrest bail.
Parity could not be ignored. Co-accused in the same FIR, facing the same allegations, had already been enlarged on bail. Once similarly placed persons have been granted relief, denying it to the appellant on a thin charge of "non-cooperation" produced an unequal and unsustainable outcome. Reading these strands together, the Court found the High Court's refusal unsustainable and set it aside.
How It Sits With Earlier Law
FollowsGurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 — the Constitution Bench foundation that anticipatory bail can be granted at any time before arrest and that the power is not to be read narrowly.
FollowsSushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1 — anticipatory bail need not ordinarily be confined to a fixed period and may continue till the end of trial.
How to Use This Judgment
When the State opposes anticipatory bail on the bald assertion that the accused "did not cooperate", this decision is direct authority that appearance before the Investigating Officer is what cooperation requires — not the surrender of the right to remain silent on particular questions. It is especially useful where the FIR springs from what is in substance a civil property dispute, and where co-accused have already secured bail so that parity can be pressed. In court, the judgment can be cited alongside Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Sushila Aggarwal to resist a mechanical "chargesheet-not-filed / not-cooperating" objection. This note is shared for general legal awareness and is not legal advice.
